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Facing response conﬂict, subjects try to improve their responses by reducing the inﬂuence
of the detrimental information which caused the conﬂict. It was speculated that this adap-
tation to conﬂict can only occur when the conﬂicting information is consciously perceived.
In this review we give an overview of the research looking at the possibility of unconscious
stimuli to provoke this conﬂict adaptation. In a ﬁrst part we discuss adaptation to conﬂict
on a trial-by-trial basis. When the previous trial contained conﬂicting information, subjects
will adapt to this by reducing the inﬂuence of the conﬂicting information on the current
trial. However, the interesting question is whether this is also possible when the conﬂicting
information remains unconscious. In a second part we will discuss blockwise adaptation
to conﬂict. If conﬂict is very frequent, subjects will adapt to this by reducing the conﬂicting
information sustainably. Again the question is whether this is possible when the conﬂict
was never experienced consciously. In a third part we will discuss the neural basis of con-
scious and unconscious conﬂict adaptation.We will critically discuss the research on these
topics and highlight strengths and weaknesses of the used paradigms. Finally, we will give
some suggestions how future research can be more conclusive in this respect.
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INTRODUCTION
A hot topic in cognitive psychology nowadays is the question
whether cognitive control can be exerted unconsciously. One
typical expression of cognitive control is adaptation to response
conﬂict. It has been convincingly shown that subjects adapt to con-
ﬂicting information, by reducing the inﬂuence of this irrelevant
information. The interesting question here is whether this is also
possible when the conﬂict itself remains unconscious. Since much
cognitive processing seems to be possible without any interven-
tion of consciousness, this is an intriguing question. In this review
we will give a clear overview of studies addressing this issue, and
elaborate on contradictory ﬁndings in the ﬁeld.
THE POWER OF UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING
One of the most challenging questions in cognitive psychol-
ogy is what deﬁnes the role of consciousness. As Lau (2009)
points out, humans feel that without consciousness we would
only be able to perform simple, reﬂexive behavior. Intuitively,
we claim that we need consciousness to execute complex behav-
ior based on our conscious intentions. Most people would agree
that consciousness has an important function in life, although
it is difﬁcult to spell out what it is precisely. However, the
answers from science are not unequivocal. An overwhelming
body of research has shown that many cognitive processes can
occur without consciousness meddling in. Yet this consensus is
a very recent one. It has long been a spirited topic of debate
whether stimuli which do not pass the consciousness thresh-
old can be processed at all. Skeptics claimed that almost all
research failed to assure that stimuli were truly unconscious (e.g.,
Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986) and false claims about sublim-
inal advertising did more harm than good (Pratkanis, 1992).
But with methodological improvements, such as better mask-
ing paradigms (Evett and Humphreys, 1981; Forster and Davis,
1984) and objective prime awareness tests (Greenwald et al., 1996)
to ensure the unconscious nature of the stimuli, the consen-
sus grew that stimuli which never enter our consciousness are
nevertheless capable of inﬂuencing on going behavior (Kouider
and Dehaene, 2007). Not only is the existence of unconscious
perception no longer questioned, accumulating evidence has
highlighted the potentially far-reaching power of unconscious
processing.
Unconscious semantic activation
Much research on unconscious processing made use of the prim-
ing paradigm. In this paradigm subjects have to respond to a target
which is preceded by an irrelevant prime. Responses to this tar-
get are faster when it is preceded by a prime which triggers the
same response as the target (i.e., a congruent prime) compared
to a prime which triggers a different response (i.e., an incon-
gruent prime). This congruency effect is a robust phenomenon
both when the prime is clearly visible and when it is masked (e.g.,
Vorberg et al., 2003). Initially, it was assumed that masked, invis-
ible stimuli could only trigger automatic response priming. For
example, Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998) showed that a prime
arrow, which is displayed for only 16 ms, is capable of activat-
ing motor responses. Dehaene et al. (1998) went one step further
and found that a subliminally presented prime number facili-
tated responses to a target number when they shared a semantic
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relation, suggesting that unconscious stimuli can be processed up
to a semantic level.
Although this semantic interpretation was not generally
accepted at ﬁrst (Damian,2001;Kunde et al., 2003), there havebeen
convincing studieswhich showed that a subliminal prime is indeed
capable of inﬂuencing the reaction to a target via their semantic
relation (Van den Bussche et al., 2009a; Van Opstal et al., 2010). A
meta-analysis on masked priming studies (Van den Bussche et al.,
2009b) conﬁrmed that even when all non-semantic inﬂuences are
excluded, subliminal primes can still evoke priming effects. So,
unconscious primes can reach a high semantic processing level.
Following the explanation by Dehaene et al. (1998) we assume
that these masked priming effects are the consequence of con-
ﬂict at the response level. On congruent trials, the prime activates
the same response as the target, whereas on incongruent trials
both sources active a different response, and this response conﬂict
slows down responding (for a different view see Kinoshita and
Hunt, 2008).
Top-down inﬂuences on unconscious processing
Next to being able to reach semantic processing levels, the effect
of subliminal stimuli is not restricted to purely bottom-up pro-
cessing. Although the inﬂuence of unconscious primes has often
been thought a static, uncontrollable process, recently research
pointed out that it can be inﬂuenced by top-down aspects such as
task demands (Norris and Kinoshita, 2008; Martens et al., 2011),
attentional focusing (Van den Bussche et al., 2010), and tempo-
ral attention (Naccache et al., 2002). Martens et al. (2011) used
an induction task to activate one of two task sets. Subjects had
to decide whether pictures of objects where living or non-living
(i.e., a semantic induction task) or whether they were round or
elongated (i.e., a perceptual induction task). This induction task
had an inﬂuence on a subsequent priming task. After the semantic
induction task priming was only observed when prime and tar-
get shared a semantic relationship, but not when they only shared
a perceptual relationship. After the perceptual induction task the
opposite was true. Likewise, Norris and Kinoshita (2008) showed
in a masked priming task that the priming effect for non-words
was dependent on the task. In a standard lexical decision task, no
unconscious priming for non-wordswas observed.However,when
exactly the same prime–target pairs were used, but now the task
was to decide whether the target was the same as a probe, uncon-
scious priming was also observed for non-words. Van den Bussche
et al. (2010) showed that spatial attention is a prerequisite for sub-
liminal stimuli to be processed. When attention was allocated to
another location, primes had no inﬂuence on the processing of
the target. In a similar vein, Naccache et al. (2002) demonstrated
that subliminal primes only inﬂuenced responses to targets when
temporal attention was allocated to the time window in which the
prime appeared. When this was not the case, no priming effects
emerged.
These studies illustrate that subliminal priming is not an inﬂex-
ible process which operates in a purely automatic, bottom-up
fashion. Our conscious preparation can have large modulating
effects on the processing of unconscious primes (e.g., Kunde et al.,
2003).
THE LIMITS OF UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING
As described above, accumulating evidence shows that uncon-
scious stimuli can be processed upto a high semantic level, and
that it is susceptible to several conscious top-down modulations.
Over the years the consensus grew that many mental activities
can be performed without awareness, and the intriguing question
arose which processes require consciousness. Does unconscious
processing have limits and does consciousness have a special func-
tion at all? A controversial position on this topic was taken by Libet
(1985) who speculated that consciousness and free will are illusory
(see also Wegner, 2002). He showed that the brain activation of an
action is present in the electroencephalogram (EEG) waveform,
several hundreds of milliseconds before the subject has the con-
scious experience of initiating the action. Recently this ﬁnding
was extended by Soon et al. (2008) who showed that the decision
to perform an action was measurable in prefrontal and parietal
cortex, up to 7 s before subjects consciously decided to act. So it
seems that consciousness has nothing to do with initiating actions,
but subjects only post hoc create the illusion that they deliberately
produced the action.
Contrary to this extreme position, Dehaene and Naccache
(2001) argued that there are borders which determine the poten-
tial role of unconscious processing. They proposed a framework
in which specialized modular systems can process stimuli with-
out conscious ampliﬁcation, as long as this is merely a bottom-up
process which requires no strategic adaptation. This bottom-up
processing of unconscious stimuli can be altered by the processing
state of our cognitive system, such as the focus of attention or the
currently activated task set, as long as this is initiated consciously.
What should, however, not be possible, is for an unconscious stim-
ulus itself to change these top-down strategies of participants.
Unconscious processing can only use these purely bottom-up
modular systems in the brain. According to Dehaene and Nac-
cache (2001), without global ignition (which is the determinant
of consciousness) these stimuli cannot initiate top-down cognitive
control, because they remain within a modular system. According
to this proposal, consciousness should be exclusively associated
with strategic operations such as planning a new strategy, evalu-
ating it, controlling its execution and correcting possible errors.
All these operations can be grouped under the term cognitive
control.
If we want to test whether consciousness is more than just
an epiphenomenon without any purpose, it is necessary to cap-
ture those behaviors which cannot be initiated by unconscious
stimuli. Focusing on cognitive control operations might offer a
fruitful approach to explore this debated issue, since they have been
speciﬁcally associatedwith consciousness (Dehaene andNaccache,
2001). This is of course not an easy task to accomplish, because
we are looking for the absence of an effect, and this can almost
always be explained by alternative interpretations. Thus we need
convincing research which is completely free from methodological
ﬂaws, to be able to answer this question.
COGNITIVE CONTROL AND CONFLICT ADAPTATION
Because cognitive control is not a well-deﬁned area of human
actions, it is important to specify the behavior under investigation.
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Many different behaviors are categorized under the term cogni-
tive control, and most deﬁnitions are very broad. For example,
Botvinick et al. (2001) deﬁned cognitive control as the human
cognitive system’s “ability to conﬁgure itself for the performance
of speciﬁc tasks through appropriate adjustments in percep-
tual selection, response biasing, and the on-line maintenance
of contextual information” (p. 624). Although exhaustive, we
risk that with such a general deﬁnition, in the end, almost all
behavior is an instance of cognitive control. Therefore in this
review we will focus on one commonly investigated expression
of cognitive control, namely the ability to detect response con-
ﬂict and adjust our behavior accordingly. It should be stressed
that research on unconscious processing was also carried out in
other domains of cognitive control. Typically, it is found that
instances of cognitive control can be inﬂuenced unconsciously,
if subjects are familiarized with the conscious variant of the
task before. For example, if subjects have learned to withhold
a response when a visible stop-signal is presented, responses
will also slow down when this stop-signal is presented uncon-
sciously (e.g., van Gaal et al., 2010a,c). Likewise, if subjects have
learned which task to perform dependent on a task cue, the
task can be primed by presenting the corresponding cue uncon-
sciously (Lau and Passingham, 2007; De Pisapia et al., in press;
Reuss et al., 2011). Finally, post-error slowing can occur, even
when subjects are completely unaware of making an error (Hes-
ter et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2009). Thus, although detecting
response conﬂict and adjusting our behavior accordingly is a com-
monly investigated expression of cognitive control, others also
exist.
A typical example of conﬂict adaptation can be found in the
Stroop task, where subjects are confronted with color words (e.g.,
green) which are printed in a color that can either match the word
meaning (e.g., green; a congruent situation) or not match the
word meaning (e.g., red; an incongruent situation). Subjects are
asked to name the ink color (i.e., the relevant information) as fast
as possible, while ignoring the word meaning (i.e., the irrelevant
information). In an incongruent situation both sources of infor-
mation trigger differential responses, and thus create response
conﬂict, which slows down responding. Consequently, responses
are usually much faster in the congruent condition than in the
incongruent condition (i.e., the congruency effect). This response
conﬂict can occur in all tasks in which relevant and irrelevant
information can potentially activate differential responses. To pre-
vent this irrelevant information to exert the same detrimental
inﬂuence later on, our cognitive system will adapt to this con-
ﬂict so that in a subsequent conﬂict situation we are better in
dealing with the conﬂict, and thus in reducing its detrimental
inﬂuence. It was proposed that the cognitive system adapts to
this response conﬂict by inhibiting the irrelevant information
(Stürmer et al., 2002) or by narrowing attention to the relevant
information (Egner and Hirsch, 2005). Wühr and Frings (2008)
showed in a within-trial paradigm that target ampliﬁcation and
distractor suppression presumably interact in selecting the cor-
rect answer. Because the precise mechanism of conﬂict adaptation
remains debated, we prefer to remain theoretically neutral when
using this term. Throughout this review, we will use the term con-
ﬂict adaptation to refer to the behavioral effects following response
conﬂict. Likewise, although other kinds of conﬂict exist, our focus
lies on response conﬂict. Thus, when using the term conﬂict we
are referring to response conﬂict.
We can dissociate two strategies to cope with this kind of
response conﬂict. We can handle the conﬂict on a trial-by-trial
basis and adjust our response strategy according to the conﬂict
in the current trial (i.e., micro-adjustments; Ridderinkhof, 2002).
Alternatively we can pick up regularities over a longer period of
time and adjust our strategy blockwise, based on this accumulated
information (i.e., macro-adjustments; Ridderinkhof, 2002).
The next section is divided into two parts in which we will dis-
cuss these trial-by-trial and blockwise strategies separately. After a
brief overview of the literature we will elaborate on experiments
investigating the (im)possibility of unconscious conﬂict to cause
these kinds of conﬂict adaptation.
AN AREA EXCLUSIVELY RESERVED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS?
CONFLICT ADAPTATION ON A TRIAL-BY-TRIAL BASIS
The strategy to cope with response conﬂict on a trial-by-trial basis
was explored by Gratton et al. (1992) with the Eriksen ﬂanker
task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). In this task subjects have to
respond to a central target letter (A or H). This target letter is
ﬂankedby irrelevant distractor letters. These distractors can trigger
the same response as the target letter (i.e., a congruent situation;
AAAAA) or they can trigger the opposite response (i.e., an incon-
gruent situation; HHAHH). Although the distractor letters are
completely irrelevant for the task, they nevertheless exert a great
inﬂuence; large congruency effects are observed under these con-
ditions. Interestingly, the authors observed that the congruency
effect was modulated by the congruency on the previous trial. If
there was conﬂict (i.e., an incongruent trial) on the previous trial,
they observed a smaller congruency effect on the current trial,
compared to when the previous trial was congruent. This implies
that subjects, facing conﬂict, adapt to this conﬂict by reducing
the source of the conﬂict (the irrelevant information) on the fol-
lowing trial. Thus although subjects are not able to simply ignore
the irrelevant information throughout the whole task, they never-
theless adapt their behavior on a trial-by-trial basis based on this
irrelevant information.
These sequential modulations have also been shown in other
paradigms such as the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004; Notebaert
et al., 2006; Lamers and Roelofs, 2011), the Simon task (Stürmer
et al., 2002; Akçay and Hazeltine, 2008; Verguts et al., 2011), and
the priming paradigm (Kunde, 2003; Kunde and Wühr, 2006).
Apparently it does not matter whether conﬂict is conveyed by an
irrelevant ﬂanker, an irrelevant word meaning, an irrelevant posi-
tion, or an irrelevant arrow (for a different view, see Egner, 2008).
Whenever the cognitive system detects conﬂict it will adapt to it
and reduce the inﬂuence of the irrelevant information on the next
trial.
UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICT ADAPTATION ON A TRIAL-BY-TRIAL BASIS
The previous part made it clear that subjects cope with conﬂict
on a trial-by-trial basis by reducing the inﬂuence of the irrelevant
information on the following trial. The interesting question now is
whether this adaptation alsooccurswhen the conﬂict itself remains
unconscious (see Table 1 for an overview of studies addressing this
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Table 1 | Schematic overview of studies looking at adaptation to conflict on a trial-by-trial basis.
Condition Prime Blank Backward mask Blank Target Adaptation to conflict
Greenwald et al. (1996)
Conscious
SARAH
50
17 83 MIKE
+
Unconscious PDGFYBYLG
17
−
Kunde (2003)
Conscious
128
126
+
Unconscious
14 28
−
Frings andWentura (2008)
Conscious Holiday
60 HAPPY
+
Unconscious Holiday
40
GJKLVWCP
20
−
van Gaal et al. (2010b)
Conscious
129
129
+
Unconscious
14 28
−
Ansorge et al. (2011)
Conscious
above
34
34 BELOW
200
+
Unconscious GYCHGLTAD
17
−
Gray boxes indicate the absence of the particular feature in a study, empty boxes indicate a blank.The numbers in the right corners indicate the duration in milliseconds.
issue). To answer this question,Kunde (2003) used ameta-contrast
masking paradigm. In this paradigm a prime arrow ﬁts perfectly
in the target contour, so that this ﬁrst arrow is rendered invisi-
ble if both are presented in short succession. To create conscious
and unconscious conditions, the prime duration was randomly
varied between 14 and 126 ms, followed by a blank of 28 ms. Inde-
pendent of the prime duration on the current trial, Kunde found
a reduction of the congruency effect only when a 126 ms prime
was presented on the previous trial (similar results were presented
by Greenwald et al., 1996). Based on this observation, he con-
cluded that we can only adapt to conﬂict on a trial-by-trial basis
when this conﬂict is consciously experienced. An important prob-
lem with this study is that the prime duration differed between
the conscious and unconscious conditions. This changed the time
between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA) which is sufﬁcient to inﬂuence priming
effects (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998).
In an affective priming experiment Frings and Wentura (2008)
held the SOA ﬁxed at 60 ms. On every trial they presented a prime
word with a positive or negative valence, followed by a target word
which could be either congruent (i.e., the same valence) or incon-
gruent (i.e., the other valence) with the prime. In the conscious
condition the prime was presented 60 ms, without a mask. In the
unconscious condition the prime was only presented 40 ms fol-
lowed by a 20 ms post-mask. Replicating Kunde (2003) they found
a sequential modulation of the congruency effect on the current
trial only when an unmasked prime was presented on the previous
trial.
Contrary to the these studies, which indicate the impossibility
of unconscious conﬂict to alter the processing of the next trial, van
Gaal et al. (2010b) challenged the hypothesis that conﬂict which
remains unconscious can never recruit top-down cognitive con-
trol. They used the same experiment as Kunde (2003), but omitted
a brief auditory warning signal at the beginning of each trial and
shortened the inter-trial interval. Contrary to Kunde (2003) they
observed conﬂict adaptation on the current trial, independent of
the visibility of either the current or the previous trial. Accord-
ing to the authors, the auditory signal in the study of Kunde
(2003) disturbed subjects’ attention and thereby wiped out any
unconscious traces. Two recent studies also claimed to have found
adaptation to unconscious conﬂict. In a priming study, Francken
et al. (2011) obtained conﬂict adaptation on the current trial, inde-
pendent of the visibility of the previous trial. However, this was
only the case in the error rates, not in reaction times. Moreover,
the visibility of their low-visibility condition was too high to be
considered unconscious. Bodner and Mulji (2010) presented only
masked primes, and manipulated conﬂict frequency. For half of
the participants 80%of the trials were congruent, for the other half
80% of the trials were incongruent. A larger priming effect for the
group receiving 80% congruent trials was only apparent when the
previous trial was incongruent or neutral. When the previous trial
was positive, no different priming effects were observed. Although
this shows that congruency effects are dependent on the congru-
ency of the previous trial, these results are qualitatively different
from those presented by van Gaal et al. In the group receiving 80%
incongruent trials, Bodner and Mulji (2010) observed numerically
smaller congruency effects following incongruent trials. However,
in the group receiving 80% congruent trials, the congruency effect
was numerically larger following an incongruent, compared to
a congruent trial. This observation is unexpected, and it is cur-
rently unclear how this can be reconciled with the ﬁndings of van
Gaal et al.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Based on the studies of van Gaal et al. (2010b) and Francken
et al. (2011) one could conclude that unconscious conﬂict can
trigger adaptation behavior. An important question is whether
these results are truly the consequence of unconscious conﬂict, or
alternatively the consequence of information which reached con-
sciousness (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2011). For example it is possible
that van Gaal et al. (2010b) found unconscious conﬂict adapta-
tion, not because the conﬂict exerted an inﬂuence on behavior
unconsciously, but because participants became somehow aware
of the conﬂict on a meta-cognitive level (e.g., Van den Buss-
che et al., 2008). For example, responses are typically slower on
incongruent trials, and perhaps subjects became consciously aware
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of this reaction time slowing. It has been shown that subjects can
reliably “read out” their own reaction times in a conscious man-
ner (Corallo et al., 2008; Marti et al., 2010). Perhaps adaptation
on the current trial can be triggered by the conscious experience
that we somehow responded slower on the previous trial. Another
way in which we can consciously experience differences on the
previous trial is because of different senses of control. Recently,
in a masked priming study it was shown that our sense of control
over action effects (i.e., a stimulus presented after responding) is
larger when the effects are produced by congruent compared to
incongruent trials (Wenke et al., 2010). Thus, although subjects are
never consciously aware of any prime, they nevertheless feel more
in control over the effects of congruent compared to incongruent
trials. A similar possibility is that subjects consciously experienced
that responding was somehow easier on congruent than on incon-
gruent trials, although the reason for this experience remained
unconscious. In this case, subjects adapted their behavior on the
current trial, based on the consciously experienced difﬁculty of the
previous trial, rather than the unconscious conﬂict of the previous
trial (e.g., Kinoshita et al., 2011).
This last point was also noted by Ansorge et al. (2011). In their
priming experiment, all primes were followed by a 34 ms blank
or a 34 ms mask, to create conscious and unconscious conditions.
To control for meta-cognitive explanations of sequential modula-
tions, they collected visibility data on a trial-by-trial basis. After
every trial, participants were asked whether they had just encoun-
tered a congruent or an incongruent trial. When the authors
analyzed only those trials on which subjects wrongly judged the
congruency of the previous trial, no sequential modulations were
found at all. This suggests that even in the unmasked condition
conﬂict awareness plays a major role. When they analyzed only
trials in which subjects correctly identiﬁed the congruency of the
previous trial, they observed sequential modulations dependent
on the congruency of the previous trial, only when the conﬂicting
information on the previous trial was unmasked. This suggests
that unconscious trial-by-trial adaptations cannot be caused by
subjects becoming aware of the conﬂict on some level. However,
also this conclusion is premature. The main advantage of this trial-
by-trial assessment is that we can determine whether unconscious
trial-by-trial adaptations can be caused by responses on those tri-
als where subjects, despite the masking, were consciously aware of
the prime or the prime–target congruency on the previous trial.
Importantly, these trials should be distinguished from trials on
which subjects really had no idea about the congruency at all,
because in the latter case an unconscious sequential modulation
effect cannot be explained by meta-cognitive processes. Unfortu-
nately Ansorge et al. (2011) gave participants only two response
options in the visibility question (“was the trial you just saw con-
gruent or incongruent?”). In this way, a confound exists between
genuine judgments and instances in which subjects really had no
idea and just guessed. This can conceal a possible unconscious
conﬂict adaptation effect.
CONCLUSION
In summary, although van Gaal et al. (2010b) and Francken et al.
(2011) recently observed adaptation to conﬂict on a trial-by-trial
basis, even when the conﬂicting information on the previous trial
was masked, it would be premature to conclude that sequential
modulations can be initiated by unconscious conﬂict. Research
on sequential modulations has repeatedly shown that subjects
only adapt to conﬂict on the previous trial, when this conﬂict
was experienced consciously. Furthermore, an alternative meta-
cognitive explanation can be readily offered for the ﬁndings of van
Gaal et al. In the Section “General Discussion” we will discuss the
conditions required to investigate this unresolved issue further.
AN AREA EXCLUSIVELY RESERVED FOR CONSCIOUSNESS?
BLOCKWISE ADAPTATION TO RESPONSE CONFLICT
The second strategy described by Ridderinkhof (2002; macro-
adjustments) to adapt to conﬂict is based on detecting blockwise
regularities of conﬂict trials. This is a useful strategy when, for
example, congruency proportions are manipulated. If in a block
the proportion of incongruent trials is much larger than the
proportion of congruent trials, the level of conﬂict is generally
elevated. Since in this situation most trials contain conﬂict, the
most economical strategy is probably to simply reduce the detri-
mental inﬂuence of the irrelevant information continuously. This
strategy is adequate for most trials and thus seems an acceptable
way to deal with the conﬂict. Adapting our behavior on a trial-by-
trial basis according to the conﬂict on the previous trial is also a
potential strategy here, but this would be much more cognitively
demanding because the majority of trials contain response conﬂict
and the cognitive system would have to reduce the inﬂuence of the
irrelevant information repeatedly. Instead, it would be much eas-
ier for the cognitive system to simply reduce the inﬂuence of the
irrelevant information sustainably. There is much evidence that
subjects effectively deal with these blockwise statistical regulari-
ties. For example Logan and Zbrodoff (1979) used a Simon task
and varied the congruency proportions. When 90% of the trials
were congruent, subjects showed a large congruency effect, with
faster reactions on congruent compared to incongruent trials. On
the other hand when 90% of the trials were incongruent, this pat-
tern was reversed. Subjects now showed an inversed congruency
effect, with faster reactions on incongruent compared to congru-
ent trials. This seems to imply that subjects somehow kept track of
the ratio of incongruent vs. congruent trials, and used this infor-
mation to improve their responses. This blockwise adaptation to
response conﬂict is also observed in other paradigms such as the
Stroop task (Tzelgov et al., 1992; Merikle and Joordens, 1997), the
Eriksen ﬂanker task (Gratton et al., 1992; Purman et al., 2011), and
the priming paradigm (Klapp, 2007; Jaskowski, 2008). So as with
trial-by-trial adaptation, it does not seem to matter how conﬂict
is conveyed. As long as there are regularities in a block, subjects
will adapt to this manipulation by changing the impact of the
irrelevant information on responding.
BLOCKWISE ADAPTATION TO UNCONSCIOUS RESPONSE CONFLICT
Based on the previous part we know that subjects strategically
adapt blockwise to the frequency of conﬂict trials in the experi-
ment. Are we also able to do this,when the conﬂicting information
remains unconscious (see Table 2 for an overview of studies
addressing this issue)? Merikle and Joordens (1997) addressed
this issue in an adjusted Stroop paradigm. Their subjects had to
name the ink color of an array of colored ampersands. These were
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Table 2 | Schematic overview of studies looking at blockwise adaptation to response conflict.
Condition Prime Blank Backward
mask
Target Manipulation Adaptation to
proportion
congruency
Merikle and Joordens (1997)
Conscious
GREEN
33
133
&&&&&&
133 &&&&&& 75% incongruent
+
Unconscious &&&&&&
267
−
Ortells et al. (2003)
Conscious
COW
33
234
&&&&&&
133 EYE 80% incongruent
+
Unconscious &&&&&&
367
−
Bodner and Masson (2001)
Unconscious
Chair
60
CHAIR 80 vs. 20% repetition +
Jaskowski et al. (2003)
Unconscious
35 35 35
80 vs. 20% congruent +
Gray boxes indicate the absence of the particular feature in a study, empty boxes indicate a blank.The numbers in the right corners indicate the duration in milliseconds.
preceded by a color word presented in gray which was incongruent
in 75% of the cases with the response to the ampersands. Only in
25% of the trials the color word triggered the same response as the
ampersands. Under these conditions subjects were able to strategi-
cally predict the color of the ampersands based on the color word,
leading toan inversed congruency effect. The interesting observa-
tionwas that subjectswere only able to strategically use this conﬂict
frequency information,when the color word was presented visibly.
When this was masked, a normal Stroop effect occurred (see also
Daza et al., 2002).
Similar results were presented by Ortells et al. (2003). They
used a semantic priming task in which participants had to clas-
sify target words as denoting animals or body parts. In 80% of the
trials the targets were preceded by a prime word of a different cate-
gory (e.g., HAND–dog) and only in 20% by a semantically related
prime (e.g., HAND–ﬁnger). When the primes were presented vis-
ibly, subjects were able to make use of this information leading
to an inversed congruency effect. But again, if the primes were
masked, subjects showed a normal congruency effect. This effect
appeared to be very robust, emerging when masked and unmasked
trials were randomly mixed within the same experiment (Ortells
et al., 2006) and when a different task had to be performed on the
targets (Daza et al., 2007).
Although these experiments highlight a qualitative difference
between conscious and unconscious conditions, it cannot be
assured that there was completely no blockwise adaptation to the
unconscious frequency manipulation. Since these studies did not
provide a baseline measure of the congruency effect, we cannot
ascertain whether the congruency effect in the masked condi-
tion was, although not reversed, nevertheless diminished. Other
authors, who did include a baseline condition, found blockwise
adaptation to unconscious response conﬂict with comparable par-
adigms. For example, Bodner and Masson (2001) used a lexical
decision task in which participants had to decide as quickly as pos-
sible whether a target string printed in uppercase (e.g., CHAIR)
was awordor anonsense letter string.Unknown to theparticipants
the target was preceded by a 60 ms prime word in lower case. This
could be a repetition of the target (e.g., chair) or anunrelatedword.
The authors compared groups receiving blocks where 80% of the
primeswere repetitions of the target and groupswhere only 20%of
the primes were repetitions, and thus 80% of the primes were neu-
tral. They found that participants adapted to these regularities, and
the priming effect was magniﬁed in blocks containing 80% repe-
tition primes. This ﬁnding was repeatedly replicated and extended
(see for example Bodner and Masson, 2004; Bodner and Dypvik,
2005; Bodner et al., 2006; Klapp, 2007; Bodner and Mulji, 2010).
A major problem with the previously cited studies is the prime
visibility. If primes in these studies were not truly unconscious,
we cannot exclude the possibility that these effects are driven by
conscious inﬂuences. For example in Bodner and Masson (2001),
although 77% of the subjects did not notice the primes, we can-
not simply assume based on this information that their primes
were truly unconscious. Additional measures need to be gath-
ered to ensure that the results are not caused by subtle conscious
inﬂuences. Unfortunately, all mentioned studies fail to satisfy this
criterion. Often no objective prime awareness data is available
(Bodner and Masson, 2001, 2004; Bodner et al., 2006), or subjects
classify primes above chance (Klapp, 2007) and authors fail to
report necessary statistics such as a signiﬁcant intercept, showing
priming at visibility zero (Bodner and Dypvik, 2005).
Interestingly, Jaskowski et al. (2003) showed blockwise adap-
tation to unconscious frequency manipulations, with a perfectly
masked prime. In a priming experiment participants were pre-
sented with two target squares side by side, and had to decide as
quickly as possible which of the two contained a gap. Unknown
to participants, each target square was preceded by four other
squares, which were shortly ﬂashed in short succession. One or
more of the ﬁrst four squares also had a gap and served as primes
for the target square. Each square ﬁtted perfectly in the following,
so that gaps in the prime were rendered invisible. The gaps could
appear in a prime ﬂashing before the target with a gap (i.e., con-
gruent) or before the target without a gap (i.e., incongruent). They
observed a strategic adaptation dependent on the ratio of congru-
ent vs. incongruent trials.When 80% of the trials where congruent
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org February 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 3 | 6
Desender and Van den Bussche Unconscious conﬂict adaptation
they observed a strong congruency effect (130 ms). When, on the
contrary, only 20% of the trials were congruent they observed a
reduction of the congruency effect (55 ms).
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Although the study of Jaskowski et al. (2003) seems to provide evi-
dence that subjects adapted their behavior based on unconscious
conﬂict, the authors instead explained their results by assuming
a meta-cognitive process. They proposed that subjects are not
aware of the conﬂict per se, but they became aware of a conse-
quence of unconscious conﬂict, namely error tendencies. Because
in blocks with 80% incongruent trials the prime mostly signals
the erroneous response, errors are much more likely in this situa-
tion. Subjectsmight become aware of a higher tendency to commit
errors in blocks containing mainly incongruent trials, and thereby
strategically adjust their behavior to a more conservative response
approach. This interpretation of their results ﬁts nicely with the
hypothesis that an unconscious stimulus itself is not able to recruit
cognitive control to change on going behavior, but the conscious
experience of a result of this unconscious stimulus is (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001). A similar argument was made by Van den
Bussche et al. (2008). In a priming study they found a larger con-
gruency effect for the target notation (e.g., Arabic number vs.
number word) which was also presented as prime in 75% of the
cases. They explained this unexpected result by suggesting that
subjects may become aware of the facilitation of the target format
which is also presented in 75% of the primes, without being aware
of the prime or the relation between prime and target. Because of
the awareness that these targets are somehow easier to respond to,
subjects focus more on them, which results in stronger priming
effects. These observations suggest that the effects of unconscious
manipulations can be very subtle and indirect, while at ﬁrst glance
they seem to provide evidence for unconscious information being
used to adapt subsequent behavior.
Kinoshita et al. (2008) proposed an explanation along similar
lines in their Adaptation to Statistics of the Environment (ASE)
model. They assume that subjects’ response strategy, according to
a speed accuracy dimension, is based on the difﬁculty of the task at
hand. If an experiment containsmainly congruent primes, the task
is very easy, because the prime always facilitates responding to the
target. Therefore subjects can try to respond very fast without the
risk of making too many errors. This will shorten reaction times
to these easy targets and thus prolong reactions on the infrequent
difﬁcult (incongruent) trials. If an experiment contains mainly
incongruent trials, the task at hand is now much harder. Because
the prime always signals the wrong response, subjects will adopt
a more cautious response deadline, in order to prevent making
too many errors. If the proportion of congruent and incongruent
trials is equal, a response deadline in between these two extremes
will be appropriate. This will slow down responses to congruent
trials and speed up responses to incongruent trials. Kinoshita et al.
(2011) argued that this response deadline is mainly inﬂuenced by
the difﬁculty of the previous trial. If the previous trial was difﬁ-
cult we will adopt a more cautious response strategy compared to
when the previous trial was easy. Moreover, these effects are asym-
metric. That is, the response to an easy trial is more sensitive to
the difﬁculty of the previous trial than the response to a difﬁcult
trial. In their experiment 3, the authors showed that the blockwise
adaptation to unconscious frequency manipulations can in fact be
explained by previous trial difﬁculty. According to Kinoshita et al.
(2011), the ASE-model can explain all studies claiming to have
found blockwise adaptation to unconscious response conﬂict. It
can be argued that the ASE-account can be seen as a more gen-
eral extension of the proposal by Jaskowski et al. (2003). In the
ASE-model not only the conscious error rate, but task difﬁculty
in general can inﬂuence responses. In order for task difﬁculty to
inﬂuence response strategies, subjects must on some level become
aware of this difﬁculty, probably without knowing the speciﬁc ori-
gin (Van den Bussche and Reynvoet, 2008). A possible explanation
for this awareness is the conscious “read out” of reaction times
(Corallo et al., 2008; Marti et al., 2010). Subjects may become
aware of the difﬁculty of the previous trial, because they con-
sciously notice that responses on difﬁcult (i.e., incongruent) trials
are slower than on easy trials.
To summarize, the meta-cognitive accounts discussed here pro-
vide a viable alternative explanation for observed results, and point
to an important methodological drawback in current research.
According to the ASE-model, the most important problem when
manipulating conﬂict frequency blockwise is that task difﬁculty
and congruency proportion are always confounded. As a con-
sequence, an alternative explanation can always be that subjects
somehow consciously experience the task difﬁculty (Van denBuss-
che and Reynvoet, 2008) or the error tendency (Jaskowski et al.,
2003). Therefore alternative ways should be addressed to investi-
gate this question. The most important problem which has to be
dealtwith is the possibility that statistical regularities can somehow
reach consciousness.
CONTEXT EFFECTS
A possible solution to disentangle congruency and task difﬁculty
is to create one context with mainly congruent trials and one
with mainly in congruent trials, and randomly switch between
them within the same block. Thus, on each trial the probabil-
ity of each context is perfectly equal. However, the probability to
encounter a congruent trial is highly dependent on the context.
Because every trial is randomly of either the mainly congruent or
the mainly incongruent type, the various difﬁculties of both con-
texts (Kinoshita et al., 2008) cancel each other out (see Table 3 for
an overview of studies addressing this issue). Because participants
need to be able to dissociate between both contexts, they need
to have a way to know which of both is at hand. This is exactly
what Heinemann et al. (2009) did. In a priming study, subjects
had to decide whether a target digit was larger or smaller than
ﬁve. Every trial started with a ﬁxation cross, followed by a prime
digit lasting 26 ms, a blank (60 ms), a mask (10 ms), and the tar-
get digit. Along with the ﬁxation cross the authors presented a
context cue in the form of a colored rectangle, whose color indi-
cated with 80% certainty whether the upcoming trial would be
congruent or incongruent. As expected, they observed that the
congruency effect was larger in the context with 80% congruent
trials compared to the context with 80% incongruent trials. This
context-speciﬁc prime-congruency effect (i.e., CSPC) was shown
before (e.g., Crump et al., 2006; Crump and Milliken, 2009), but
Heinemann et al. found that it only occurred when the prime was
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Table 3 | Schematic overview of studies looking at the possibility of unconscious context effects.
Condition Context cue Prime Blank Backward
mask
Target Context
effect
Heinemann et al. (2009)
Conscious ->80% congruent 9
26
%&$
70 1
+
Unconscious ->80% incongruent
60
%&$
10
−
Van Opstal et al. (2011)
Unconscious: high similarity A a vs. a a
33 # #
67
4 4
+
Unconscious: low similarity A a vs. a D
33
Gray boxes indicate the absence of the particular feature in a study, empty boxes indicate a blank.The numbers in the right corners indicate the duration in milliseconds.
truly visible. When they ﬁlled the 60 ms blank with a mask, which
rendered the prime unconscious, the congruency effect did no
longer differ between the two contexts. Although the context cue
was still clearly visible, its moderating effect completely vanished.
Apparently, subjects in the masked condition never acquired the
contingency between the cue and the congruency of the upcoming
trial. A possible explanation is that an arbitrarily chosen cue is not
signiﬁcant enough for participants to be automatically linked to
statistical regularitieswhich remain unconscious (VanOpstal et al.,
2011). To examine this possibility, future studies need to create
more task-relevant, self-evident contexts, compared to presenting
an arbitrary cue before every trial.
Van Opstal et al. (2011) took a ﬁrst step in this direction by
showing that the inﬂuence of primes on targets can be reversed
by an unconscious context. In their experiment subjects had to
decide whether two target digits (e.g., 4 4) were the same or dif-
ferent. Unknown to participants, the targets where preceded by
two prime letters, which also could be equal or not. The authors
compared the priming effect of moderate similar primes (e.g., a
A), dependent on the context in which they were presented. Half
of the subjects received these unconscious primes in a context
of completely dissimilar primes (e.g., a D). In this situation these
moderate similar primeswere relatively equal and as a consequence
facilitated “same” responses. Conversely, the other half of the sub-
jects received these unconscious primes in a context of completely
similar primes (e.g., a a). In this situation these moderate similar
primes were relatively different, and as a consequence facilitated
“different” responses. This nicely illustrates that an unconscious
context can affect our behavior.
CONCLUSION
Summarizing research on blockwise adaptation to unconscious
response conﬂict, the emerging picture is complicated. In an
attempt to disentangle conscious and unconscious processes, some
studies showed inversed congruency effects, as an adaptation
to blockwise manipulation of conﬂict frequency, for conscious
conditions only (e.g., Merikle and Joordens, 1997; Daza et al.,
2002). They interpret these qualitative differences as evidence that
cognitive control is exclusively reserved for consciousness. Stud-
ies showing blockwise adaptation to conﬂict frequency, even in
unconscious conditions, challenge this conclusion (e.g., Bodner
and Masson, 2001, 2004; Klapp, 2007). Nevertheless, no study
to date has shown reversed congruency effects when the conﬂict
itself remained unconscious. So a tempting conclusion would be
that there are graded differences between adaptation to conscious
and unconscious conﬂict, but adaptation can occur in both situa-
tions.Unfortunately, this conclusion is premature, since alternative
meta-cognitive accounts have challenged the notion of blockwise
adaptation to unconscious response conﬂict (e.g., Jaskowski et al.,
2003; Kinoshita et al., 2008, 2011). Currently, there is just a single
study to counter these criticisms (Van Opstal et al., 2011), so it
would be worthwhile to test its robustness and generality in future
research.
CONFLICT ADAPTATION: THE NEURAL BASIS
Behavioral studies on conﬂict adaptation showed a large dis-
crepancy in the literature. Many studies ﬁnd robust effects of
adaptation to response conﬂict, when the conﬂict is consciously
perceived. When conﬂict remains unconscious, the evidence is far
fromclear-cut.Apossible tool to answer this question is to broaden
the scope of research methods, and look at the neural basis of con-
ﬂict adaptation. Using functional MRI (fMRI) and EEG, we can
study whether certain brain areas are differentially activated by
conscious and unconscious conﬂicting information.
CONFLICT ADAPTATION IN THE BRAIN
An interesting question is how the brain knows when to reduce the
inﬂuence of conﬂicting information. In their conﬂict monitoring
theory, Botvinick et al. (2001) proposed that the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC) constantly monitors for response conﬂict. They
presume that when differential responses are suggested by stimuli,
this activates the ACC which detects this response conﬂict. Subse-
quently it will in turn activate the prefrontal cortex (PFC), which
then takes remedial actions to reduce this conﬂict. A critical dis-
cussion of this proposal lies beyond the scope of this review, so
we will conﬁne us to a clear overview of brain studies addressing
response conﬂict. In the Stroop paradigm, there is much evidence
that the ACC is indeed activated when the word meaning and the
ink color trigger a different response (MacLeod and MacDonald,
2000). Also in the ﬂanker and the Simon task, the ACC proved to
be activated when there was conﬂict between the relevant and the
irrelevant stimulus dimension (Botvinick et al., 2004; Botvinick,
2007). There is also evidence for the hypothesis that, when facing
conﬂict, the ACC activates the PFC to cope with this conﬂict. In
an fMRI study using the Stroop task, Kerns et al. (2004) observed
that the congruency effect on the current trial was reduced, when
the preceding trial was an incongruent trial which caused strong
ACC activation. As expected, after incongruent trials, the dorsolat-
eral PFC was highly activated, thus conﬁrming its role in conﬂict
adaptation.
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Beside these effects of reactive control, other studies looked at
the impact of cues which were predictive of the upcoming conﬂict
(e.g., Sohn et al., 2007;Correa et al., 2008;Aarts andRoelofs, 2010).
Sohn et al. (2007) presented input values in the form of two letters
(e.g.,B I) onwhichBoolean arithmetic tasks, according to different
rules, had to be performed. All rules speciﬁed a relation between
the input values (e.g., both I, one I, both not I, one not I) and an
output value (e.g., I or B). Half of these rules implied low-conﬂict
because they formed a positive relation between input and output
(e.g., “if both input values are I, then the output is I”). The other
half of the rules were high-conﬂicting because there was a negative
relation between input and output (e.g., “if both input values are
I, then the output is B”). Along with the input, an operator was
presented which indicated which rule had to be performed on the
input. On half of the trials, the authors cued the upcoming rule,
by presenting the operator 9 s before the input. When no cue was
presented, the ACC and lateral PFC were hardly activated. When
a cue was presented, both areas were signiﬁcantly more activated.
Interestingly, the activation of the ACC and the lateral PFC was
much higher when the cue predicted an upcoming high conﬂict
trial, compared to an upcoming low-conﬂict trial. Although this
seems to suggest that the ACC is not only involved in detecting
response conﬂict, but also proactively signals that conﬂict is to be
expected, a recent study observed no different ACC activity when
comparing cues signaling upcoming congruent or incongruent tri-
als with 75% certainty (Aarts and Roelofs, 2010). Thus, although
the ACC has been shown to be activated on conﬂict trials, its role
in anticipatory behavior is currently under debate.
Although fMRI has a good spatial resolution, its temporal res-
olution is very limited. To circumvent this problem, EEG can be
used to look at the time course of conﬂict situations. In EEG
studies, activation of the ACC is believed to be expressed in
the N2 (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), a negative deﬂection in the
EEG waveform with a fronto-central scalp distribution that peaks
approximately 250–350 after stimulus presentation (Yeung and
Cohen, 2006). Consistent with the role of the ACC in the conﬂict
monitoring theory, the amplitude of this component is more neg-
ative on incompatible compared to compatible trials (Wendt and
Luna-Rodriguez, 2009; Clayson and Larson, 2011; Purman et al.,
2011).Another component typically associatedwith response con-
ﬂict is the P3, a positive deﬂection in the EEG waveform with a
central–parietal distribution occurring 350–500 ms after stimulus
presentation (Clayson and Larson, 2011; Frühholz et al., 2011).
The latency of this component is found to be prolonged for incon-
gruent compared to congruent trials (Purman et al., 2011). Some
suggest that this is because the P3 is an index of the stimulus eval-
uation (Kopp et al., 1996; Purman et al., 2011), and incongruent
trials take more time to be evaluated. Others have suggested that
the P3 represents response inhibition (Frühholz et al., 2011), since
it is more positive on incongruent compared to congruent trials
(Clayson and Larson, 2011; Frühholz et al., 2011). Evidence for
this latter interpretation comes from a study which points to the
inferior frontal cortex, an area associated with response inhibition,
as the neural generator of the P3 (Nee et al., 2007). Clayson and
Larson (2011) measured both the N2 and the P3 in an Eriksen
ﬂanker task and found evidence for conﬂict adaptation on these
components. Mirroring the sequential modulation effect in the
behavioral data, the difference in amplitude between an incongru-
ent and a congruent trial was reduced when the previous trial was
incongruent, compared to congruent. This was true for both the
N2 and the P3.
In summary, a large body of fMRI data conﬁrmed the role
of the ACC in detecting response conﬂict, and the PFC in cop-
ing with this conﬂict. Also EEG studies support the notion that
speciﬁc brain mechanisms respond to response conﬂict. To get
more insights into the possibility of unconscious conﬂict to trigger
control processes, these brain measures can also be used. If uncon-
scious conﬂicting information is unable to activate the ACC and
the PFC, this would suggest that conﬂict adaptation is a preserved
area for consciousness.
UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICT ADAPTATION IN THE BRAIN
In a classical brain imaging study, Dehaene et al. (1998) found
that even masked primes could activate the motor cortex. In the
light of this observation, it should be a fruitful approach to look
whether the brain areas activated by conscious conﬂict, are also
activated when the conﬂict remains unconscious. Although an
overwhelming number of studies focused on the role of the ACC
in conﬂict situations, in the area of unconscious conﬂict adapta-
tion this research is very scarce. In one isolated study,Dehaene et al.
(2003) replicated their previous study (Dehaene et al., 1998) and
looked whether trials containing response conﬂict (i.e., incongru-
ent trials) activate theACC.As expected,when primes were visible,
large congruency effects were observed and the ACC was strongly
activated when comparing conﬂict to no-conﬂict trials. Interest-
ingly, when primes were masked, no differential ACC activity was
observed when comparing both trial types, despite the presence of
a signiﬁcant congruency effect. Thus, although the unconscious
irrelevant information hampered performance, its conﬂict with
the relevant information did not trigger the ACC. In contrast, a
recent study observed activation of the caudal ACC when com-
paring unconscious conﬂict with no-conﬂict trials (Ursu et al.,
2009). In this experiment subjects had to respond to the position
of consecutively presented faces (primary task), while remem-
bering which faces were presented (secondary task). Unknown
to participants, the position of each face predicted the position
of the next face with 70% accuracy. Subjects implicitly learned
this rule, as evidenced by faster reaction times on predicted loca-
tions, but never became aware of this contingency because the
distraction task was too demanding. On the 30% of trials where
the position of the face was not predicted, the implicitly learned
sequence was violated, and although subjects never consciously
noticed this, the caudal ACC was nevertheless activated during
this conﬂict.
These contradicting results seem to suggest that unconscious
conﬂicting information can activate conﬂict sensitive brain regions
(Ursu et al., 2009), but only when the information itself was expe-
rienced consciously (Dehaene et al., 2003).However, an alternative
explanation can account for this dissociation. In the study of
Dehaene et al. the congruency effect in the masked condition
was, although signiﬁcant, twice as small as in the visible condi-
tion. So it is possible that these authors observed ACC activation
only for conscious conﬂict, because the conﬂict conveyed by the
maskedprimeswas not sufﬁciently strong (Mayr,2004).Whenever
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conﬂicting information has a larger impact in the conscious con-
dition, as evidenced by larger congruency effects, this alternative
cannot be ruled out.
Other studies have looked at the potential role of the pre-SMA
in dealing with unconscious conﬂict. In a priming study, Wolbers
et al. (2006) manipulated unconscious conﬂict frequency block-
wise. They observed a tight coupling of the pre-SMA with the
lateral occipital complex and the putamen, when comparing a
block with 80% incongruent trials to a block with 80% congru-
ent trials. Likewise, in another priming study, it was shown that
the size of the congruency effect was negatively correlated with
the pre-SMA gray-matter density, independent of the prime vis-
ibility (van Gaal et al., 2010d). Unfortunately, prime visibility of
the masked primes in both studies was far above chance-level, so
it is questionable whether these results tell us something about
unconscious conﬂict.
In summary, although a few studies addressed the brain mech-
anisms responsible for resolving conﬂict which remains uncon-
scious, there is an important gap in the literature on this topic.
So in order to learn more about the mechanisms of unconscious
conﬂict adaptation, more brain imaging research is necessary.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this review we discussed studies looking at the (im)possibility
of conﬂict which remains unconscious, to have an inﬂuence on
behavior. Answering this question will help us to unravel the
purpose of consciousness. Much research was stimulated by the
work of Dehaene and Naccache (2001), who speculated that con-
sciousness is a prerequisite for top-down cognitive control. Only
one single study convincingly showed trial-by-trial adaptation to
unconscious conﬂict. (van Gaal et al., 2010b). All other studies
indicate that modiﬁcation of behavior on a trial-by-trial basis,
depending on the conﬂict of the previous trial, is only pos-
sible when this conﬂict was experienced consciously. Evidence
for blockwise adaptation to conﬂict, is much more ambiguous.
Although some studies presented qualitative differences between
conscious andunconscious conditions (e.g.,Merikle and Joordens,
1997), there is much evidence that subjects can adapt to uncon-
scious statistical regularities. However, it is currently debated
whether this truly reﬂects adaptation to unconscious conﬂict (e.g.,
Bodner and Masson, 2001, 2004) or whether it is actually an
adaptation to information which somehow reached conscious-
ness (e.g., Jaskowski et al., 2003; Van den Bussche and Reynvoet,
2008). To date, only one recent study presented evidence that
unconscious stimuli can create an unconscious context, while
excluding meta-cognitive explanations (Van Opstal et al., 2011).
An alternative to circumvent problems of behavioral studies is to
look at brain measures of unconscious conﬂict. Unfortunately,
although a large body of research explored the brain mechanisms
involved in conscious conﬂict (Botvinick et al., 2004), this type
of research is virtually lacking in the ﬁeld of unconscious conﬂict
adaptation.
In the remainder of this review we will discuss the conclusive-
ness of existing studies regarding these questions. We will look at
strengths and weaknesses of all studies and give some suggestions
how future research can tackle questions which research hitherto
failed to answer conclusively.
ARE WE LOOKING AT COGNITIVE CONTROL?
An important point in the research on unconscious conﬂict adap-
tation is thatwe shouldbe cautious about theoriginof an effect.We
should not be satisﬁed showing that a result can also be obtained
when the conﬂicting information is masked, but also take into
account the uncertainties this area faces. Namely, we should be
sure that the behavior under investigation is an expression of cog-
nitive control at all. For both issues discussed here, trial-by-trial
and blockwise adaptation to response conﬂict, alternative expla-
nations in terms of low-level learning have been proposed (Logan,
1988; Hommel, 1998). Hommel (1998) claimed that trial-by-trial
adaptations could be perfectly explained without assuming any
control process.He argued that trials are responded to fastest when
the stimulus and response features are exact repetitions or com-
plete alternations from these features on the previous trial. If only
some features, but not all, overlap with the previous trial, this will
create interference and slow down responses. This low-level learn-
ing mechanism can completely explain sequential modulations,
without assuming cognitive control processes (e.g., Mayr et al.,
2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Mayr and
Awh, 2009). Likewise, blockwise adaptation to response conﬂict
can also be explained by low-level learning mechanisms. When
80% of the trials are congruent, we have also practiced these trial
types more often. It is well known that we become faster with more
practice (Logan, 1988), so the effect can be perfectly explained,
without assuming any inﬂuence of top-down cognitive control. It
can even be argued that blockwise adaptation to response con-
ﬂict is actually an expression of trial-by-trial adaptation (e.g.,
Kinoshita et al., 2011). If a block consists of 80% incongruent
trials, the previous trial will be by deﬁnition incongruent on 80%
of the trials. The cognitive system will react to this by reducing
the inﬂuence of the irrelevant information (Gratton et al., 1992),
which will reduce the congruency effect on 80% of the current
trials. On average this will cause small congruency effects, which
can be misleadingly taken as evidence for blockwise adaptation to
conﬂict. Although there is compelling evidence that trial-by-trial
adaptations (e.g., Ullsperger et al., 2005; Kunde and Wühr, 2006;
Notebaert and Verguts, 2007), and blockwise adaptation (Tzelgov
et al., 1992) cannot entirely be explained by these accounts, stud-
ies who try to show that these effects can also occur when conﬂict
remains unconscious, should take these explanations into consid-
eration and try to rule them out. For example, when manipulating
conﬂict frequency blockwise, with only a limited number of stim-
uli (e.g., Klapp, 2007) reaction times are always confounded with
the frequency with which certain prime-target combinations (i.e.,
congruent or incongruent) are exposed. To rule out this low-level
learning mechanism, the stimulus set can be enlarged, so that all
primes and targets occur equally often (Bodner and Masson, 2001;
Egner and Hirsch, 2005; Crump and Milliken, 2009). Likewise, as
long as two consecutive trials with the same congruency are com-
plete repetitions or complete alternations, and two consecutive
trials with a different congruency always partial repetitions, a fea-
ture explanation can always explain trial-by-trial adaptations. To
rule out this explanation,more than two response options (Kunde
and Wühr, 2006; Lamers and Roelofs, 2011) or more than two
stimulus dimensions (Kunde and Wühr, 2006) can be used, so
that all consecutive trials are complete alternations.
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ARE WE COMPARING CONDITIONS BASED ON A DIFFERENCE IN
CONSCIOUSNESS?
Toprovide conclusive evidence that adaptation to response conﬂict
cannot be initiated by unconscious stimuli, we have to ascertain
that the only difference between the conscious and the uncon-
scious condition is solely consciousness. In the conscious condi-
tion subjects need to be aware of the conﬂict and in the uncon-
scious condition they must not be aware of the conﬂict, not on
any level (e.g., Jaskowski et al., 2003; Van den Bussche et al., 2008).
Although this seems a trivial requirement, existing paradigms do
not seem to be able to satisfy this criterion. For example, Kunde
(2003) and van Gaal et al. (2010b) varied the SOA to create a con-
scious and an unconscious condition. Frings and Wentura (2008)
matched the SOA between both conditions, but failed to keep the
prime duration constant. Even when prime duration and SOA are
perfectly matched between both conditions (e.g., Ansorge et al.,
2011), the absence of unconscious sequential modulations can still
be explained by other accounts. Primes are typically followed by a
maskin the unconscious condition and by a blank in the conscious
condition. Because thismask rapidly destroys the presented image,
this also impedes prime processing in this condition. As a conse-
quence, the signal strength of the prime is much stronger in the
unmasked condition (Lau, 2009; Francken et al., 2011), and these
primes had more possibility to activate conﬂict sensitive regions
(Dehaene et al., 2003), and inﬂuence behavior on the subsequent
trial. This difference in signal strength is typically expressed in sig-
niﬁcantly smaller (e.g.,Greenwald et al., 1996;Dehaene et al., 2003;
Kunde, 2003; van Gaal et al., 2010b), or at least numerically smaller
(e.g., Frings and Wentura, 2008; Ansorge et al., 2011) congruency
effects in the unconscious condition. To deal with this problem,
Francken et al. (2011) proposed to match for these low-level dif-
ferences in signal strength by masking all primes equally long. To
create conscious and unconscious conditions they used effective
(i.e., meta-contrast masking for low-visible trials) and ineffective
(i.e., pseudomasking for high-visible trials) masks. They observed
identical priming effects in both conditions. However, although
the authors showed that the priming effect for high and low visible
primes is identical when the signal strength is matched, the ques-
tion remains whether this is also the case with a truly unconscious
condition. Nevertheless, this is an important ﬁrst step, because
only if also the signal strength is matched between both condi-
tions, more ﬁrm conclusions can be drawn about unconscious
trial-by-trial adaptation.
ARE UNCONSCIOUS PRIMES UNQUESTIONABLY UNCONSCIOUS?
As a ﬁnal remark we want to discuss measures of prime visi-
bility. If we want to be sure a prime was truly unconscious, we
have to provide strong evidence to support this. Again, although
this seems a trivial requirement, many studies fail to satisfy this
point. This ranges from no detection task at all (Merikle and
Joordens, 1997; Bodner and Masson, 2001, 2004; Ortells et al.,
2006), up to the absence of adequate follow-up analyzes when
the detection task is above chance-level (Ortells et al., 2003; Bod-
ner and Dypvik, 2005; Klapp, 2007). Additional analyses showing
no correlation between our detection measure and our prim-
ing effect, a signiﬁcant intercept showing priming at zero vis-
ibility, or the presence of the effect in a subgroup with zero
visibility, can give us more conﬁdence about the unconscious
nature of the primes. Although the introduction of post detection
tasks was a major progress in research on subliminal process-
ing (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), this measure does not sufﬁce
in research on unconscious conﬂict adaptation. This is because
unconscious sequential modulations can be caused by trial-by-
trial adaptations to the difﬁculty of the previous trial rather than
to the conﬂict. Likewise, blockwise adaptation to unconscious
conﬂict can be caused by adaptation to the conscious difﬁculty
of a block. Therefore it is necessary to collect prime awareness
data on every trial, to control for these possibilities. A disad-
vantage of this measure is that these long inter-trial interrup-
tions possibly wipe out short-lived unconscious traces, which will
impede trial-by-trial adaptation. Nevertheless, without this infor-
mation we cannot dissociate between truly unconscious adap-
tation, and adaptation to information which somehow reached
consciousness (Jaskowski et al., 2003; Van den Bussche et al.,
2008).
CONCLUSION
In this review we gave a clear overview of research looking at
the possibility of unconscious information to trigger adaptation
behavior. Dehaene andNaccache (2001) speculated that top-down
cognitive control is one class of behavior which can only be initi-
ated consciously. Although there is some evidence that adaptation
to unconscious conﬂict both on a trial-by-trial and blockwise
basis is possible, almost all evidence suffers from serious method-
ological and theoretical problems, which hampers progression in
this important ﬁeld of research. In future research, it should be
further clariﬁed to which extent unconscious stimuli are able to
trigger conﬂict adaptation, while avoiding the problems discussed
in this review. This will help us to further elucidate the purpose of
consciousness.
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